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Summary
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) currently
funds a total of 25 Native Title Representative Bodies (NTRBs) nation wide.
These bodies are the primary means of delivering services to indigenous
claimants seeking determinations of native title rights. The present ATSIC
Board of Commissioners have agreed to an increased funding allocation to
native title matters in the 1998/99 budget. This means that the Native Title
Program will receive a total allocation of $47.155, million elevating it's
significance considerably within ATSIC's funding and administration.
However, while the increased funding commitment recognises the
importance of land rights issues for the indigenous constituency, ATSIC, the
National Native Title Tribunal and some Aboriginal groups are concerned
about the capabilities of some NTRBs to provide a professional, viable and
competent service in an increasingly complex legislative and legal domain.
The argument of this paper is that the 1995 ATSIC Review of NTRBs
provided a window of opportunity for establishing sound administrative
praxis for NTRBs, but their recommendations were only adopted to a limited
extent. However, ATSIC has also implemented a number of strategies,
including performance monitoring and reporting, training and education,
peer reviews and recently, service agreements to improve and support NTRB
organisations. Unfortunately, as in the past, many of these mechanisms
have had limited success in leading to organisational change. Why is this?
The paper suggests that, by and large, indigenous organisations operate
through exclusively indigenous concepts of process, accountability and
ideas of communal good, and that these concepts often diverge from
external, non-indigenous views of process. An additional limitation is that
self-determination often forms the prevailing context of administration and
management at many levels of indigenous governance and decision-making.
In the author's view, a radical change in organisational culture is ultimately
only possible through the exercise of the political will of the ATSIC Board as
a top-down approach, coupled with ancillary support strategies, such as
monitoring and reporting mechanisms, organisational reviews and other
options ATSIC program administrators can provide. The solution to effective
service delivery lies, in part, in ensuring that indigenous organisational and
management principles are inclusive of mainstream management
expectations which relate to accountability and notions about 'the greater
good'.
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Introduction
This paper examines key challenges facing Native Title Representative Bodies
(NTRBs) four years after the establishment of the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA), and
prior to the commencement of the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (NTAA) and
the implementation of changes outlined in the new legislation.
The analysis owes much to the author's field observations as an
anthropological consultant engaged by NTRBs and,consequently, is inclusive of
the variations in contemporary organisational practice while also highlighting
broad similarities and common policy implications.
Three major challenges face the current 25 NTRBs. Two of these challenges,
namely, reforming organisational processes and recognition of the strategic role of
NTRBs, are interrelated. The former has been a commonly discussed theme
across the corporate spectrum of Aboriginal service and community organisations
(see Dillon 1992, 1996; Rowse 1992; Sanders 1993a, 1993b; Martin 1995;
Sullivan 1996).
The third challenge, that of authenticating or signing off on claims and
contractual agreements under terms specified in the NTAA, is increasingly likely
to require prioritisation by NTRBs of some forms of Aboriginal group identity over
others. This is an emergent issue for NTRBs, although one which the Central and
Northern Land Councils have met over many years (see Smith 1984).
I have problematised discussion of these three challenges by posing three
questions:
• Are changes in structural processes and administrative program procedures
and performance reporting sufficient and necessary to improve NTRB
strategic performance and client accountability?
• If indigenous community organisations are fundamentally and essentially
driven by internal cultural dynamics, is their corporate culture malleable to
the demands of other parameters, (such as program/service outcomes,
performance indicators and quality control)?
• Finally, where does native title fall in the policy arena? Are native title issues
the medium of self-determination or of something else; and is service
provision a more appropriate forum for achieving action in native title
matters in the future?
Organisational practice
An initial premise in my argument is that for many Aboriginal people, in settled
Australia especially, native title represents a significant window of opportunity to
participate as stakeholders in mainstream economic development. Second, that
many NTRBs, in line with the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission's
(ATSIC) own philosophy, see native title as an opportunity to implement self-
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determination. Consequently, some NTRBs treat claimant groups as autonomous
decision-makers with authority across a range of matters affecting claim research
and mediation procedures, including overall responsibility for progressing their
claims. Unfortunately, such an approach can result in hands-off procedural
practices and arguments over entitlement and access under a rubric of social
justice (see Merlan 1994: 12-27).
A further point linked to questions one and two, is that many NTRBs are
currently performing neither adequately nor appropriately; indeed, frequently
many are dysfunctional. For example, informal evidence indicates that a high
proportion of native title claims are proceeding outside the umbrella of many
NTRBs. There are various reasons for this. In some, although limited, cases, areas
do have a determined NTRB (for example, north-west Queensland, Tasmania). In
other situations, claimants have strategic reasons borne of local politics for by-
passing the NTRB; just as independent action can reflect a high level of
dissatisfaction with the existing NTRB.
In identified cases of poor performance a range of approaches and solutions
have been suggested and tried. Generally, most proposals highlight some form of
organisational restructuring, support through administrative and managerial
training, the application of funding restrictions by ATSIC, or consideration of
more appropriate legislative regimes for incorporation and development of the
constitution. The extensive analytical literature in relation to performance and
governance issues for incorporated Aboriginal organisations attests to the
perennial interest in these matters (see, for example, Rowse 1992; Altaian and
Smith 1994; Smith 1994; ATSIC 1995; Finlayson and Smith 1995;Fingleton
1996; Finlayson 1997).
Aboriginal people have also identified what they see as root causes of poor
performance. Aden Ridgeway, formerly of the New South Wales Aboriginal Land
Council (NSWALC) for example, when responding to the IndependentCommission
Against Corruption (ICAC) inquiry into corruption in regional and local New South
Wales Aboriginal land councils, argued these were a product of hierarchical
structures which concentrated power in the hands of the 'largest Aboriginal
families' (The Australian, 29 April 1998). His less-than-cost-effective solution was
to replace the heads of each council with a board of directors. Another Aboriginal
commentator told ICAC that immense problems were caused by lack of
consultation between land council executives and their constituents, especially
when coupled with poor accountability mechanisms (The Australian, 29 April
1998).
In this paper I consider the question of what happens if the reforms fail?
What if we assume, as case material suggests, that no amount of tinkeringwith
organisational issues actually brings about sustainable change, reform or
transformation? What if we were to assume that indigenous adherence to internal
cultural and political dynamics had,and has, greater force and attraction than
the reform measures? What, in such circumstances, would be a reasonable
means to ensure effective professional servicedelivery?
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Review of the NTRBs
I argue a number of reasons for revisiting the ATSIC Review. First, because its
timely delivery into the policy realm provided an opportunity to nurture strategic
and successful NTRBs. Second, the ATSIC Review, in common with a number of
subsequent reviews and assessments, has failed to significantly impact on the
increasing and fundamental difficulties of service delivery and organisational
performance faced by NTRBs. Supporters of NTRBs have countered such criticism
with arguments about the short life span of NTRBs and how established land
councils, such as the Northern and Central Land Councils, evolved and developed
to their present stature and effectiveness over a 20-year period.
No doubt consideration should also be given to the political climate in which
NTRBs have operated since 1993; where arguments have been made by both
Commonwealth and State Governments and vocal lobby groups of the inherent
'uncertainty' in the NTA and the 'unworkability' of the Wik High Court decision for
coexistence of property rights on some pastoral leases. Further, the introduction
of new legislation reopens the window of opportunity for significant and strategic
reform of NTRBs. In addition, the Native Title Program is the third largest ATSIC
program (after the Community Development Employment Projects scheme and
Community Housing Infrastructure Program). In the 1998/99 global ATSIC
budget allocations, the Native Title Program managed to attracted $47.155 million
of the available funding dollars).
NTRBs face escalating performance pressures heightened by a number of
factors, including the limitations of annual funding cycles. Across the country
many NTRBs are responding to their current workloads with only varying degrees
of appropriateness, in spite of ATSIC's supportive efforts to provide standardised
models for operational procedures, a formula for workload funding, and
appropriate employment conditions for permanent staff and consultants (see the
list of remedial and supportive measures outlined in ATSIC 1996-97: 135).
However, in 1995 when the review was undertaken, the review process
created a policy expectation that timely and comprehensive recommendations
could result in proactive strategies for NTRBs and positive outcomes for their
clients. Indeed, escalating enthusiasm for lodging claims and securing the right to
negotiate process highlighted the need for strategic approaches to workloads and
case management at both the micro- and macro-level, and comprehensive funding
allocations through ATSIC program delivery.
Consequently, newly-determined NTRBs were reviewed only a year after the
1993 Act's introduction. This timing made it possible for any necessary
recommendations to be made, providing the first comprehensive organisational
and procedural format for NTRB development. Indeed, Review recommendations
concentrated not only on issues of immediate concern, but were careful to
foreshadow anticipated long-term procedural and performance challenges.
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Australia-wide consultations were conducted. This enabled
recommendations to be responsive to on-the-ground organisational realities; for
example, to accommodate differential resourcing, organisational idiosyncrasies,
and the varyingly successful records in meeting statutory obligations.
Recommendations were comprehensive; for example, they covered the nature of
the statutory role and responsibilities of the NTRB, operational jurisdictions,
workloads and resource needs, funding, management and administration, as well
as mechanisms for future processual and performance reviews (see ATSIC 1995:
v-vi).
The Review Committee hoped that:
our report provides a comprehensive framework to ensure the appropriate
development and resourcing of Native Title Representative Bodies over the
next five years. We recommend that implementation of the report's
recommendations begins immediately owing to clear evidence that native title
parties urgently require enhanced support, particularly in regional contexts.
This provides ATSIC with a unique opportunity to proactively mentor new
Native Title Representative Bodies and offer them enhanced support (ATSIC
1995: iv).
Aboriginal organisations which had immediately gained ministerial
determination were in some cases, experienced corporate players (for example the
Northern Land Council; Central Land Council; NSWALC and the Cape York Land
Council); others were inexperienced players and were often erratic in their
response to performance standards. On all counts, NTRBs were new
organisational 'beasts', totally unlike the land councils, and were expected to
provide instrumental service delivery (see Smith 1995).
However, the Committee were mindful of the role model successful peak
bodies such as land councils offered, and this perception was reflected in many of
their proposals. In addition, ATSIC was able to immediately implement some of
the Review's recommendations such as the recommendation to contain funding
within NTRBs instead of making direct allocations to claimant groups; and the
recommendation to ensure that all program funds within ATSIC were quarantined
as national program funds and were therefore not available to ATSIC regional
councils for discretionary distribution.
The Review Committee also distinguished between two Aboriginal
organisational models. Model One was represented by the larger, established
representative organisations with previous experience of indigenous land-based
interests under other legislative regimes (such as the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 and the New South Wales Aboriginal Land Rights Act
1983). Model Two organisations were usually extensions of small community
organisations or non-statutory 'land councils' which were now called upon to play
a new, and often more regionally representative, role.
The Review sought a balance between attention to detail and articulation
with the broad policy picture in which these details had an instrumental role for
organisational efficiency. This approach was driven by a number of imperatives;
not least that NTRBs were to have a pivotal role in the operation of the Act (ATSIC
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1995: vii) with representational responsibilities to native title claimant parties.
Specific organisational imperatives were also mentioned, although the Review
Committee identified four key principles for an effective agency role. These
principles were:
i. the capacity of an NTRB to offer claimants access to high calibre
representation;
tt. financial resourcing through economies of scale;
ill. opportunities for strategic leverage with industry and government
stakeholders in mediation and through the RTN processes; and
iv. options for strategic outcomes outside of litigation through agreement
processes encompassed by the Act and by coordination of land
interests/needs with the Indigenous Land Corporation (ATSIC 1995: ix).
The Reviewwas formally presented to the ATSIC Board in August 1995. The
Review Committee highlighted their recognition of a window of opportunity for
the:
growing evolution and resolution of native title issues, the [need for the] roles
and responsibilities of Native Title Representative Bodies ... to be more clearly
defined, initially in program guidelines and regulations ... and economies of
scale and scope ... [to produce] cost effective implementation of native title
policy objectives (ATSIC 1995: ill).
The set of identified common principles were coupled with a
recommendation for eventual mandatory powers for all NTRBs. A detailed
framework of policies and procedures was proposed for coordination and
prioritisation of claims; claimant education in the native title process; broadly
representative structures to encompass native title interests within jurisdictions;
organisational policies and procedures to ensure transparency in decision-making
and prioritisation of claims; accountability to constituents (see ATSIC 1995:xi).
These recommendations were expected to have a five-year shelf life (ATSIC 1995:
iv). Between 1995and 1998some recommendations have been implemented as
mentioned above (see also ATSIC 1997: 135; including subsequent policy
decisions for case-load funding and the expansion of the organisational models to
a third category as part of tighter performance monitoring).
But in my view, the value of the Review has been under-estimated if not
overlooked; at least by NTRBs. No practical blueprints existed at the time for
establishing and operating an NTRB; nor were there practical guidelines for the
routine conduct of NTRB responsibilities in an increasingly competitive and
pressurised field of interest groups. In such a policy and political climate, the
importance and value of the Review should have been self-evident to all levels of
ATSIC and NTRBs, not just to the program administrators.
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Do changes in processes bring changes in performance?
Review members predicted the exponential increase in workloads for NTRBs just
as they also recognised that claim work would be geographically specific and
industry-related (see Lewington, Roberts and Brownley 1997: 203-15). The Review
recommendations have been extended by recent model policies and procedures
for dealing with applications and other related issues (see Kauffman and Wilson
1998) and efforts to introduce uniform national service standards. Specific
strategies such as targeted organisational reviews, and specialist in-service
programs have also been initiated to establish and maintain levels of NTRB
professionalism and enhance performance reporting (see ATSIC 1997: 135-6).
However, substantial performance problems remain at the operational and
representative levels for a majority of NTRBs. Why should this be so?
Explanations vary. Some NTRBs face geographical disadvantage. Small
organisations are frequently captured by intense localism and partisan politics.
Increasingly the need to undertake professional work by NTRBs is outstripped by
the lack of available experienced staff. We also know that competent professionals
can be limited in their capacity to perform tasks by a dysfunctional organisational
environment.
Nevertheless, in my view, many of these issues are not core matters, since,
ultimately, the fundamental dynamics of all indigenous organisations flow from
the internal indigenous political realm; and,arguably, this is so whether we are
focusing on a specific NTRB governing committee or the ATSIC Board. Internal
political dynamics certainly determine much decision-making and subsequent
deployment of NTRB resources regionally, as they are equally present in policy
decisions about NTRB relationships with all levels of government, including
relationships with external bodies like the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT).
Externally, NTRBs are now confronting changes in the political complexion
of governments at Federal and State levels which will significantly impacted on
them. Recent Federal Government intervention and legislative amendments have
impacted on the NTA; heritage protection changes, changes to ATSIC's global
funding allocations, and more recently, increased public scrutiny of ATSIC's
accountability and funding decisions. These shifts both represent and foreshadow
changes in the policy status and legislative positions of indigenous rights in the
contemporary Australian nation state.
ATSIC sits uncomfortably between ministerial intervention in their programs
and structures, and the ATSIC bureaucracy's own imperative to intervene when
necessary in the indigenous organisations they support. Self-determinationmight
well be the policy framework in which ATSIC operates, but ATSIC constantly faces
questions about public financial accountability, performance reporting and
compliance issues associated with their program funding role to a range of
community organisations.
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ATSIC's performance, in terms of public accountability, has become a
popular political issue for many of its critics; and cases no doubt exist where
questions of compliance were necessary. However, the future policy environment
is unclear in terms of how ATSIC can simultaneously deal with the external
political pressures from governments for repeated performance and financial
auditing, and the internal question of bench marking best practice in NTRB
performance and management, standardising administrative procedures and
requiring responsible self-determination. One of the impediments to achieving
such a conjunction is a political ideal of the present Federal Coalition Government
for diversity of choice and competition policy in service delivery. As a
consequence, the view that claimant parties should be serviced by a single
organisation (such an NTRB or statutory land council) with a monopoly on a
particular service provision may not be sustainable as a long-term position, even
if, practically speaking, it is the most cost-effective and sensible service delivery
option. One of the ironies of such a position is that ATSIC may be forced to
support claimant activities outside, or in opposition to, NTRB representation.
Indigenous corporate cultures: the challenge of change
If the Review Committee had a clear vision of the statutory relationship between
NTRBs and the NTA, indigenous expectations were often entirely different. In fact,
the idea of representation has emerged as a major site of interpretative difference
amongst indigenous parties as well as commentators. The Review Committee
recognised that:
There is some uncertainty about exactly what representative refers to and how
it is assessed for the process of ministerial determination (ATSIC 1995: 16).
Historically, Aboriginal organisations are fuelled by the dynamics of
indigenous kinship and community politics. But for NTRBs this organic energy is
potentially complicated by the statutory requirement that such bodies be
representative according to other criteria.
What exactly does representative mean for the organisations' constituents;
and do these parallel understandings held by ATSIC as the NTRB's funding
source? The Review Committee strongly argued that:
NTRBs are,first and foremost, organisational advocates for their native title
constituents. The Review Committee suggests that minimally they must be
able to demonstrate that they can act for and serve the interests of a
sufficiently broad cross-section of their indigenous constituency. The main
issue then remaining is what organisational procedures and structures
facilitate adequate representation and accountability to indigenous
constituents who wish to utilise their services {ATSIC 1995: 16).
Clear and indisputable interpretations rarely occur on the ground. Given the
history of Aboriginal community organisations, differences of interpretation are
understandable. Many Aboriginal organisations developed in hostile contexts
which encouraged them, as marginalised groups, to pursue oppositional
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strategies. For example, many indigenous health and housing services emerged
because mainstream services failed to adequately address indigenous needs and,
historically, many State governments enacted legislation to limit indigenous
people's access to community health, education, employment and legal services.
After 1975 and the Whitlam Labor Government (1972-75) this changed to some
extent. For the first time, funds were allocated to establish sustainable indigenous
community organisations, while self-determination enabled many Aboriginal
people to articulate and organise services on their own terms.
Unfortunately, more than 20 years later, many initial teething problems of
organisational and representative structures remain. The release of the ICAC's
(ICAC 1998) Report on Investigations into Aboriginal Land Councils in New South
Wales (Corruption Prevention and Research Summary), and the two volume Review
of the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 (ACA) (see Fingleton 1996)
demonstrate the prevalence of governance problems in cross-cultural contexts
(see also Martin and Finlayson 1996).
Sourcing the causal factors of governance problems has been variously
tracked to technical issues, such a need for more appropriate legislative models
for incorporation under Corporations Law regimes (see Mantziaris 1997). Others
have argued for particular forms of regulatory mechanisms on funding and the
possibility of developing comprehensive workload funding models (Kauffman and
Wilson 1998); while still others argue a comprehensive need for education and
training in human and financial resource management and accountable forms of
decision-making (see ICAC 1998). The urgency with which solutions to these
issues are needed has not been lessened by the expansion and increasing
complexity of the native title claims processes and associated legislation.
At the local level, the practice of representative governance has also been
assailed in the claims process. For instance, in situations where strategic
prioritisation of claims is critical, or where policy decisions and funding
allocations must necessarily distinguish between applicants, many organisations
have encountered resistance to operating through a transparent and accountable
process which implies a broad-based consideration of consequential factors. In
local and regional contexts Aboriginal constituents anticipate that partisan,
rather than objective, decision-making inevitably drives procedure; or as
Ridgeway suggested, power and control are a function of the numbers game (The
Australian, 29 April 1998).
What I am arguing is that the under-performance by NTRBs is part of a
spectrum of organisational challenges which are characteristic of all incorporated
Aboriginal organisations, including some organisations established in the mid-
1970s for whom the challenges continue. The conundrum for ATSIC is the
necessity to walk a fine line between necessary intervention and commitment to
self-determination; a tension which is repeated between claimant groups and
their NTRB, especially when the process is characterised as necessarily claimant-
driven.
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In my view, these continuities arise because it is the culture of indigenous
community politics, rather than models of managerialism or technical knowledge,
which determine indigenous organisational action and behaviour. These dynamics
are an implicit feature of the nature of indigenous corporate groupings and have
been variously described in the native title literature by Keen (1994), Peterson
(1994), Stead (1994), Martin (1995), Gladstone (1996), Levitus (1996), Rumsey
(1996) and Button (1995; 1996) to name a few. Related issues of authority,
representation and individual and group entitlement, are evident in the literature
on resource development and indigenous people (see Dillon 1991; Levitus 1991;
Trigger 1998).
Few critics of organisational inefficiency appreciate the force of these factors
or accommodate them in their resolutions for enhancing performance and
implementing change. Instead, complaints of corruption or under-performance
are considered best met with targeted training and educational initiatives. ICAC,
for example, argues that improved performance and administrative transparency
amongst local and regional New South Wales Aboriginalland councils is linked to
management and training. Better and more intensive training is needed because
these are multi-functional organisations which control substantial amounts of
money in the absence of any support and without fundamental knowledge of the
required administrative and ethical processes (ICAC 1998: 6).
More recently, Ivanitz (1998) argued that the mechanisms of performance
monitoring for indigenous organisations were too culturally foreign to be
appropriate. She developed a case for incorporation of culturally inclusive forms
of accountability in acquittal procedures and administrative reckoning.
At the local level. Aboriginal people are accountable to each other in terms of
distribution of goods and services and kin-based obligations. It may be
considered more important for the leader of a community to provide, for
example, a motor for someone's boat than it is to ensure that mainstream
auditing requirements are met. The boat motor enables the individual to feed
his family or earn a living. The money to purchase the goods may have come
from an existing health program budget. The rationale for the purchase is that
if an individual is earning a living and is a productive member of a
community, there will be less use of the medical system and no use of
government transfer payments in the form of social assistance. The logic of the
decision for the purchase of the boat is sound from an Aboriginal perspective:
meaningful employment resulting in a self-sufficient family and better health.
The government acquittal process may, however, see this as an inappropriate
capital expenditure. Therefore, the community is in breach of its grant (Ivanitz
1998: 36).
I take an opposing view to Ivanitz. In my experience, community
organisational accountability is very firmly (even too firmly), tailored to Aboriginal
cultural conceptions of kin-based obligations and the necessary flow of goods and
services. Indeed, the current difficulties with accountability and transparency are
likely to be an inversion of Ivanitz's proposition; that is, organisational
accountability is wholly inclusive of Aboriginal views and mechanisms and may
operate with only tangential relevance to mainstream acquittal processes. This
makes it a matter of educating Aboriginal organisations to incorporate
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mainstream acquittal mechanisms, rather than excluding them as irrelevant. It
also means that any emphasis for change must ensure the inclusion of
mainstream acquittal processes and not simply appear as a change in form. Part
of the difficulty of incorporating mainstream accountability in indigenous systems
is the conceptual and cultural shift involved, from exclusive to inclusive, from
local to the regional, from the personal and familial to the wider general
community.
I do not deny the importance of education and training for functional
competency and a shift to more inclusive representative positions. However, if
specific internal dynamics subvert such cultural change, it may not be realistic
for ATSIC to expect to achieve a turn-around in NTRB practice and performance
through its policy and program delivery alone.
The realisation of our vision depends on the empowerment of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander peoples and the achievement of real self determination
(ATSIC 1997:vii).
The policy vision in which organisational management operates is self-
determination. This often curtails ATSIC's capacity to guarantee NTRB
competency and effective management.
Existing strategies and directions for enhanced NTRB performance are
outlined in ATSIC's most recent annual report (see ATSIC 1997: 135). Yet best
practice models may be insufficient on their own to ensure organisational change
and efficiency, especially if there is no compulsion to implement best practice and
in the absence of mandatory powers for NTRBs; a situation which prevailed under
the NTA. However, the recent promulgation of NTAA will necessitate changes
which extend the statutory functions of the NTRBs, while requiring them to re-
apply for accreditation when best practice issues with take on particular
significance.
Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 3 of the NTAA outline broad structural changes
and additional functions expected of the NTRBs, and a 12 month transitional
period during which redefinition and re-gazettal of the boundaries of NTRB areas
will occur alongside NTRB re-accreditation. Simultaneously, ATSIC is
implementing significant changes to performance and acquittal requirements for
all those who deal directly and indirectly with ATSIC. Their introduction of a
service charter agreement has initially been directed to NTRBs, but is part of a
wider strategy to establish national benchmarks for indigenous management and
administration standards and consolidation of performance monitoring.
Service charters have a number of objectives. One is to set benchmarks for
best practice between the contracted parties. Another objective is to articulate
consistent standards for administration and management. In general terms,
service charters are another strategy to ensure contractual parties appreciate that
their funding and performance involves responsibilities and obligations and that
these may be used as performance criteria. In this sense, a service charter
provides a policy framework in which actions can be measured against identified
criteria with the promise of follow up action where appropriate. Potentially, service
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charters have the capacity to broadly encapsulate a new administrative and
quality service for the next generation of NTRBs; especially since some would
argue that the context and premises in which the 1995 ATSIC Review was carried
out are no longer relevant.
Native title matters has certainly been a dynamic political and policy
situation over the past few years; however, change is now overtaking another
sphere of indigenous affairs—service delivery. It is arguable whether claimant-
driven positions are, or will be, sustainable in the increasingly bureaucratic and
legalistic native title arena. Moreover, with the increasing legislative opportunities
for many State governments to embark on their own native title legislation and
tribunal processes, indigenous rights will not be quarantined from further public
and political scrutiny.
Claimant-driven processes in the native title arena have often been
presented as arguments for self-determination and social justice; although such
processes have also masked complex political questions of which sector of
indigenous interests actually drives NTRB policy and action. At the extremes are
NTRBs without any systematic or strategic direction for progressing claims
research. Nevertheless, often they continue to operate through ideologically-based
management strategies which, when combined with largely oppositional
negotiation and mediation positions, effectively diminish the capacity to realise
sustainable and effective native title outcomes. Is structural and administrative
change possible in organisations like these?
The strategic role of NTRBs
A critical future challenge for NTRBs is reinventing themselves (Stead 1995),
especially with mandatory re-registration now compulsory. There is an increasing
need to transform themselves from the reactive, oppositional creatures of a
previous political climate, to strategic, proactive organisations capable of
recognising and seizing the political moment in a manner that ensures beneficial
outcomes for their clients. The successful NTRBs of the future will need to be as
skilled in negotiation and tactical compromise as they have, in the past, been
keen to oppose it.
However, for this transformation to occur it must be centrally driven and
sustained by ATSIC and the ATSIC Board since there is often denial of reasons to
reform at the local level, despite ATSIC linking outcome provisions with funding
allocations.
A difficulty common in many of the smaller NTRBs and already alluded to
with respect to professional competency, are tensions between the administration
and the governing body. Until the introduction of service charters, ATSIC could
offer little in the way of effective strategies to NTRB staff who found their capacity
to perform efficiently limited by inappropriate intervention from the NTRB's
governing committee; or where an NTRB's constituency consistently complains of
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NTRB failure to equitably represent their interests; or where the impact of
repeated indigenous challenges to elected NTRB officials are frequent and entail
upheavals in staff employment conditions and security.
ATSIC already has the monitoring capacity to become informed of such
difficulties; but increasing bureaucratic pressure to assume wider administrative
reporting procedures is not an effective answer. These situations require the
influence and impact of a tight policy framework coupled with the political will to
produce sustainable change since, by and large, NTRBs quite simply will not be
able to produce such changes unassisted.
Until the Native Title Amendment Bill was passed, the introduction of
threshold mechanisms was already impacting on the claims process to stimulate
change. In some States, notably Queensland and Western Australia, State
governments had developed criteria incumbent on applicants before mediation
sessions between the parties was possible.
The proposed introduction of the NNTT's differential allocation of resources
policy (DARP) was a further effort to promote systemic change. Prior to the
introduction of the NTAA, DARP was to be progressively implemented in those
States with urgent needs for streamlining the claim process (for example,
Queensland and Western Australia).
DARP was an attractive option from the Tribunal's perspective. First, native
title claims currently before the Tribunal are exceeding the capacity of Tribunal
resources given the intensive labour resources required to mediate and case
manage them. For instance, there are more than 700 registered native title
claims; more than 7,000 future act notifications and only 19 members. At the
individual level, Radio National's Background Briefing program (14 June 1998) on
native title reported that one full-time NNTT member (Rick Farley) was mediating
90 claims.
Second, the number of claims and their increase makes it impossible for
equitable management. Third, many NTRBs are not functioning efficiently and in
some States significant proportions of claimants are presenting applications
independently of an NTRB. Fourth, the Tribunal seeks to match allocation of
resources with the high probability of a successful outcome. Finally, a policy of
differential allocation of resources means strategic decisions are made for an
appropriate use of resources. DARP would require NTRBs to act strategically in
decision-making over claims, in prioritising research, and in reaching
performance objectives.
All native title applications would be streamed according to DARP's
identified criteria and -then Tribunal resources (in personnel and services) would
be differentially allocated to applications. Criteria for streaming would encompass
a range of factors such as the extent of intra-indigenous conflict; the ability of
claimants to show evidence of connection to country; the ability to form a
prescribed body corporate; the willingness of the State to enter into mediation,
and so forth. Applications would be variously streamed as claims with a high
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priority for mediation; high priority referral (to the Federal Court for
determination); or further preparation required (to proceed to mediation). These
allocations would also be periodically reviewed by Tribunal members.
Not all NTRBs were enthusiastic about prioritisation. Some argued that
such a process inhibits decision-making in the context of self-determination. As
one NTRB complained:
we have a decision-making structure which may make it difficult for us to
fully participate in any attempt to develop agreed policies and procedures for
prioritising the allocation of resources to claims ... We have 5 reference groups
from which we take instructions, and we try not to set or dictate any
priorities. As far as possible we work to ensure reference groups make
decisions for the Land Council on how best to assert and pursue native title.
The Land Council refers native title matters to reference groups, as they arise,
and we aim,to the best of our ability, to provide a professional service equally
available to each reference group, offering legal expertise, research experience
and other services on request (unpublished document in author's possession
1998).
Altaian and Smith (1994: 27) have pointed out in relation to the monitoring
of royalty associations, that self-determination often results in a 'hands-off
practice where hands-on support is actually required. Ironically, DARP may
provide external support for ATSIC's introduction of national benchmarks and
service charters. But in the era of a new native title act, many State governments
will prefer to use state-based legislation and jurisdictions to deal with claim
issues and processes and NNTT policies like DARP may have little effective
relevance.
Social justice and self-determination: appropriate policy
contexts for native title?
In settled Australia NTRBs are increasingly dealing with claims involving removed
(or historical) people and those of the stolen generations. An emergent tension
relating to these claims is the position different groups have with respect to
differential claims to, and knowledge of, country.
Such issues first gained prominence in Queensland with the need to
accommodate Aboriginal people in the diaspora—the so-called traditional and
historical peoples (Rigsby 1995: 25 ff; Finlayson 1997; Martin 1997; also see
numerous Northern Territory land claim books) and have re-emerged as another
means for distinguishing between indigenous insiders and outsiders (value-laden
terms replete with Aboriginal politicking).
The NTAA has introduced requirements for the process of claim registration
associated with pathways to additional entitlements such as the right to negotiate
(now no longer an automatic entitlement on lodgement). All currently lodged
claims and all those to be lodged in the future will be subject to the new
registration test on two sets of conditions (seeS.190B conditions of merit; and
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s. 190C conditions of procedural and other matters). There are also regulations
about certification by the NTRB of the claim and the authority of the applicant to
lodge the claim (see s.61 and s.62). Authorisation and certification have specific
meanings in the Act.
Anthropologists and other claim researchers are likely to be called upon for
the certification process. In a process which foreshadows the new Act, Keen
(1998) argued that the contemporary role of NTRB researchers parallels in fact
that of anthropologist Norman Tindale who developed extensive data banks of
indigenous genealogical information as an extension of government policy.Keen's
own research has been open to different interpretations by claimants.
Several Gippsland Koories have reacted to the research in preparation of
native title claims, including genealogical research, with questions such as,
'why do we have to prove who we are all the time?'. Others see the
representative body as an arm of government, and hence its work as
oppressive. In this view the researcher is a State functionary, busy
encouraging people into divulging sometimes intimate details of their families,
as an aspect of the administration of legislation that is oppressive. In others'
eyes the representative body is a Koori organisation that represents their
interests, and the research is a legitimate tool for advancing their own
interests and autonomy (Keen 1998).
Under both native title acts, genealogical information plays a crucial role in
evidence of connections to country. Applicants must demonstrate not only
connection to the early indigenous regional population, but also traditions of
continuity (see Keen 1998; Finlayson and Curthoys 1997). However, a recent
Federal Court decision on the Aboriginal identity of certain individuals in
Tasmania raises questions which many NTRBs may need to prepare for.
Justice Ron Merkel found that the onus was on the Aboriginal community
to establish who was Aboriginal (The Hobart Mercury, 21 April 1998). Also,
because of the sociological complexities involved, Merkel found it impossible to
have simply one definition of Aboriginality and impossible that the question of
identity should be made by 'an Aboriginal body' (such as a land council or
community organisation).
Yet such issues of authority and authenticity are likely to surface in right to
negotiate arbitrations and claims, particularly where the legal onus is on
claimants to prove their rights and interests and the effects of industry action on
them. Consequently, special conditions in arbitration will only be granted if
evidence of the need for it is provided.
However, I suggest that NTRBs will also be asked to make judgments which
involve the rights of traditional and historical people when arguing the priority of
some claims over others and in relation to certification and authorisation
procedures required in S.190C of the NTAA. Although similar issues have
previously been tackled in Northern Territory claims, native title operates from a
different legislative basis and may be more restricted in its potential for inclusion
and resolution. Hard decisions about core issues like identity make the challenge
of arbitrating between constituents and being representative formidable, yet
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absolutely critical. In the event of requirements for the new NTRBs to form
obligatory judgments it is not difficult to see the tensions which will arise in
relation to meeting statutory requirements, while also seeking to implement the
principles of self-determination and social justice.
Conclusions
This paper has raised some difficult and confronting questions for NTRBs and
ATSIC policy makers generally. The view that better administrative processes and
mangerialism necessarily improve NTRB performance is questioned because the
corporate organisational history of Aboriginal bodies shows the continuity of long-
term, systemic problems of accountability, transparency and governance. After 20
years of operation, some organisation and service providers continue to flounder
because of repeated failure to address such issues. Consequently, any review of
organisational history demands answers as to why organisational change and
enhanced performance is not sustainable when training in management and
administration is provided and support to achieve performance outcomes is
forthcoming.
A central conclusion of this paper is that, as a policy, self-determination has
encouraged self-management through a hands-off low level of intervention and
that this approach cannot resolve systemic problems. This view would seem to be
true whether we are focusing on the micro- or macro-level of Aboriginal
corporations. Self-determination, often expressed in the NTRB context as a
claimant-led process, also makes political intervention from the national level
problematic.
But the crux of my argument is that the real dynamic of organisational
behaviour owes everything to local and regional indigenous political and cultural
imperatives; a dynamic often evident at the macro-level. If we accept this analysis,
then the real dynamic for change can only come through the exercise of political
will at the national policy level. The governing committees of regional NTRBs have
little incentive to change, especially when, in their view, the main game is the
internal political strategising for control and management of resources and a local
monopoly on decision-making. Accountability to internal indigenous objectives
will always be paramount because it is the most meaningful one. This point
largely explains the source of tensions between administrative staff and governing
bodies; they work for different objectives.
Professionalised workplaces and appropriate service delivery by NTRB staff
are limited when NTRB governing committees argue that they have every right, in
the context of self-management, to intervene in daily administrative decision-
making and practice. In my view, ATSIC staff more generally face similar
limitations in their workplace with regard to monitoring indigenous performance
outcomes.
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In both cases, ultimately, these tensions may only be resolved by breaking
the nexus between the elected officers and professional personnel. If this can be
achieved, the impact of administrative and managerial reform can enhance the
potential to bring about effective and sustainable outcomes in Aboriginal service
delivery.
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